Cappelen and Lepore's "Varieties of Quotation" builds on Davidson (196g, 1'979) to give an account of mixed quotation. The result is a rich paper, which introduces interesting data and raises many thought-provoking questions. Given this, I can't possibly discuss the paper in its entirety. Instead, I intend simply to paraphrase their position, develop it a little, and then raise a few concerns.
Paraphrase and Development
Let me begin with their example. cappelen and Lepore give to sentence (1a) the neo-Davidsonian logical form in (1b).
Alice said that life "is difficult to understand" 1u[says (Alice, u) & samesays(a that) & same-tokens (&, these) ]. Life is difficult to understand
As a first pass: The logical form (1b) is true if and only if Alice said something which has both the same content and (at least in part) the same form as the demonstrated sentence'Life is difficult to understand'. For Cappelen and Lepore, then, mixed quotation, like indirect quotation, gives the content of the reported utterance; and, like direct quotation, mixed quotation specifies (in part) the form of the reported utterance. This is their proposal about what mixed quotation speech reports mean in English. But-a point which looms large in the following-the proposal isn't a semantic theory of mixed quotation reports . . . at least not yet. To get a semantics for mixed quotation Cappelen and Lepore need (at least) to (1) (a) (b) specify some kind of compositionar rnechanbm which, loosely speaking, takes mixed-quotation sentenc€s as inpur and gives th";;;;ir-r!s as output' (Less loosely speaking, the desired mechanism would take surface struclures as input and give logicar forms as output.) I want to begin by re-|":i:ls^:l yhar such a mechanism might look lii". Mt,.;;;i?iemerge rn oue course.
. cappelen and Lepore aren't unaware of the need to provide a compositional mechanism for mixed quotations. They even prouide a hint, in footnote 2'1', about what it wourd Iook rike:'says' in (1a),ihey maintain, takes as its. grammatical object both the complement clause (2$ and the Np in (2b)-and this is why the sentence functions both as a direct and indirect speech report. (2) (a) (b) [cp that [, life is difficult to understand]] lpp "life is difficult to understand"]2
Putting aside the important question of how the verb ,says' can take two grammatical objects, this proposal demands an interpretive rule for,say,-one which covers three possible cases: nominal object, clausal objeci, or both. cappelen and Lepore don't provide an interpretive rule, but here's a simplified attempt. I intend it to be in the spirit of their view-so that, should there be problems with it, the problems will arise for their view as well. Returning to example (1a), rule (3) works as follows: Because, it,s supposed,'says' takes the clause (2a) as its grammatical object; and ,says' a/io takes the NP in (2b) as its grammatical object, both samesays and same-tokens enter into the logical form. By (3c).s (o in this case is'Alice'; B is,Life if difficult to understand'.) while 'samesays' deals with the content of the utterance, 'same-tokens' seizes on its form. Next step:'that' demonstrates Remarks on the Syntax and Semantics of Mixed euotation 261 the whole of 'Life is difficult to understand,, while .these, demonstrates only'is difficult to understand'. In which case, (1a) is predicted true iff Alice uttered something which (a) samesays,Life is difficult to understand, and (b) same-tokens'is difficult to undersiand,. That, in a nutshell, r; Cappelen and Lepore,s proposal for the meaning of mixed quotation-fleshed out with a simplified compositional mecha_ nism. I now want to consider some problems with the view. I'll begin with some difficulties it inherits directly from Davidson's paratactic vlew_in particular, his inclusion of a demonstrative in the logical form of speech reports.
Troubles with the ..Demonstrative,'
This section contains two arguments for the same conclusion: There is no demonstrative in the logical form of speech reports corresponding to the 'that' of 'says that'. If this is right, then there is no demonstrative, corresponding to 'that', in the logical form of mixed qaotation speech reports. In which case, to put it bluntly, cappelen and Lepore's proposal cannot work.
A Demonstrative in the Syntactic Structure?
As everybody knows, the English'that' in speech reports corresponds to 'que' in French; and, of course, the word 'que' is not a demonstrative in French. This fact might suggest the following bad argument against Davidson's paratactic view:
$) The Bad Argument Premise l:The word'que' in French belief reports isn't syntactically a demonstrative. Conclusion: Dayidson's paratactic view is mistaken about French.
The argument in (4) is a glaring non-sequitur. As Lepore and Loewer say (1-990: 98), "That a demonstrative does not appear, for example, in French and Italian propositional attitude sentences does not show that the paratactic account is wrong for these languages." One reason the premise doesn't entail the conclusion is this: There could be a demonstrative in the logical form of French speech reports, even if there is no demonstrative word in the surface structure. Armed with this thought, consider the fact that, syntactically speaking, the English word 'that' which follows 'said' in (5a) is not the same word which precedesois a goof in (5b).
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Given (8) , the fact that Engrish (and French) speech reports don,t (generally) contain demonstratiu" t".t* in,surface syntax suggestsdoesn't entail, but suggests-that there's no demonstruiir" i., ,rr"ir logi_ cal form' But why believe (g)? There is, first of alr, a u".y gooj'-ethodological reason: Downplaying syntax, when doing ."-unii"ils a risky business. As I said above, .emunti"r has two parts: on the one hand, the semanticist attempts to find the meaning of tle various forms in ttre tan_ guage; on the other hand, she looks for the compositional rules which map these forms onto their.meanings. If you are interested in the mapping from structure to meaning, you obviously cannot ignore syntax: that would be to ignore one of the relata in the relation. (Aiamiliai example: one solid motivation for assignin g generalized quantifiers to Engiish quantifier phrases, rather-than treating them syncategorematically as Russell did, is that quantifier phrases are syntactic constituenls of English sentences.) Indeed, even if your interest is restricted to finding out what expressions mean, you cannot ignore the combinatorial task-becatse which meaning ought to be assigned to an expression ,E will sometimes depend, in part, on what the simplest, most plausible, compositional mechanism assigns to E so, semanticists ignbre syntax at their peril.
A second reason for endorsing the Interface Rule: It is useful elsewhere. consider the following case. Some wacky semanticist could, I suppose, convince himself that the Spanish (9a) has the logical form (9b):
(e) (a) No s6 si voy air ftrans.: "I don't know whether I will go,,] (b) I don't know: Yes, I will go our eccentric semanticist might next conjecture that the logical form of the English 'I don't know whether I will go'is (9b) as well!This hypothesis is, I take it, quite absurd. How might we set this nutty semanticist straight? We might say: "But look, Spanish ,si' in (a) corresponds not to the English 'yes', but rather to the English 'whether'."
To which he will undoubtedly reply: "That an affirmation marker does not appear in the corresponding English sentences does not show that my account is wrong.,' And he'll be right, because there could be an "affirmation marker,, in the logical form of English sentences, even though there isn't one in surface structure. Nor need he be swayed by differences in intonation between affirmation-si and complementizer-si: He'll simply point out that, even if there isn't an affirmation word in the Spanish surface structure, there could be one at logical form.
Still, one need not give into the hypothesis that (9b) is the logical form of (9a)-and of its English translation. Here's one reason, among others:
Semantics should' ceterjl-4a.riba$ respect syntax; and the syntax of Engrish strongly suggests that (9b) isn't the logical form of the English sentence oI don't know whether I will go'; similarly, comparative syntax'suggests that.I don't know: Yes, I will go' isn't the logical form of itr" sputii-rt, (9a). of course this response relies on (8) , the Interface Rule. Bui surely the response, though not the only one possible, is among the reasonable rebuttals. And so is the Interface Rule on which it depends.
From here on,I'll assume that the Interface Rule in (g) is a sound principle. But does it apply to the case at hand? In particular, can it license the inference from Davidson's account not respecting syntax to its semantic inadequacy? The following example suggests that it can-and it provides more hints abolt why (8) is sound.
In discussing Davidson's paratactic account of propositional attitudeq Higginbotham (1986:39) drew attention to sentences like'Everv bov believes that he is a nice fellow',in which a pronoun in the complemint "iuur" is bound by a quantifier in the matrix sentence. Mixed quotational sentences can be like this too. Witness (10).
(10) Every student says that she "is cool"
How would Cappelen and Lepore treat this sentence? The rough-andready rule I gave in (3) obviously will not work: If we take as o the quantifier phrase 'every student', the predicted logical form is:
The logical form (11) gives the existential quantifier widest scope, which (wrongly) predicts that there is a single utterance produced collectively by all the students. Rule (3) can be fixed however, to accommodate quantifier phrases in subject position, without doing violence to Cappelen and Lepore's proposal. Here's the result: Given this revised rule, sentence (10) gets cashed as (13c), in which the universal quantifier is correctly given wide scope. But, even post-revision, there remains a problem for the paratactic account. Sentence (10) has a bound variable reading for'she'-and this isn't captured by (13c), becsuse'she', in that logical forrn, isnl in the scope of any quantifr.er'She', not being bound, gets read as a free variable/indexical in (13c). So sentence (10) is predicted to have only the meaning that every student said that, e.g.,that girl there is cool-'she' being said while demonstrating this particular girl. Clearly this is wrong:The salient reading of (10) has each student saying of herself that she is cool.
Consider now a different account of the semantics of speech reports, summarized in (1a) below. Crucially, it uses the fact that'that'in speech reports is a complementizer; and, respecting (8) The Oxford-MIT Rule, devised as it was with syntax in mind, can take advantage of the indices in the surface structure of sentence (10 In essence, because'sher' in the embedded clause 'she, is cool' is co-indexed with the subject quantifier phrase in (16a),'sher' gets treated as a variable, bound by the universal quantifier. Applying the rule for a universal quantifier phrase, this gives rise to (16b). Applying lambda conversion-where, of course, x, gets changed to .rr-gives the salient reading for (10):
The Davidsonian account-basically that in (12)-does not respect (8) , and the fact that'that' in speech reports is a complementizer; it does put a demonstrative into the logical form, and it thereby puts the complement clause outside the scope of any quantifier in the matrix sentence-which yields the wrong result. As Higginbotham (1986) The Odord-MIT Rule, on the other hand, respects syntax. Doing so, it al_ lows quantifiers (and other elements) in the matrix to bind items in the complement clause.T I think it's obvious that the oxford-MlT Rule does better in this respect.
could the neo-navidsonian develop a compositionar mechanism which handled this sort of sentence, while mainiainins that there is a demonstrative in the logical form? I suppose so. woritd the resulting compositional mechanism be as elegant and simple as that in (1a)? I greatly doubt it. ultimately, both accounts must prbvide a mapping from syntactic structure to the logical form each prop-oses for speech reports; but, and this is the crux of the matter, something like the oxford-MlT Rule is likely to be simpler, more elegant and jusf plain better because it respects syntax. syntactic structures are, after all, the inputs to semantic rules. So, semantic rules which profit from syntactic iniigtrts can't help but fare better. Generally speaking, anyway. That is wtry 1sy is a sound inductive principle.
Another illustration of my contention that, in the case at hand, respecting syntax simplifies the semantics of speech reports. Some of our speJch is declarative. But some of it isn't. And, when we speak in other moods, our speech can be reported; it can even be reported using mixed quotation. Given that Alice's brother is John, I can truthfully report that:
(19) Alice asked where John "bought all that beer."
An account of mixed quotation must assign a meaning to (19); but neither the rough-and-ready rule in (3), nor the quantifier,friendly version in (12) will do the job. (For simplicity's sake, I'll discuss the former rule in what follows.) First, some obvious reasons: Sentence (19) doesn,t contain the word 'says'; nor is the grammatical object of the speech-reporting verb of the form [., that [, F]] .H"nc", strictly speaking, (3) does not apply. But this is easily taken care of: Just substitute 'speech-reporting verb'for'says'in (3), and allow the grammatical object to be anything of the following form (taking y to be a meta-linguistic variable over syntactic complementizers). This generalized version of (3) now applies to the syntactic structure of (19), Alice asked where John ,,bought iit ttrat beer,,,. So much for obvious, and easily solved, difficulties with (3). Here's the h,arder case: what logical form does (21), the generarized version of (3), assign to (19)? rf 'where' is treated as the syntactic complementizer in the surface structure-i.e., as [" y]-then the predicted logical form is (zza);il on the contrary,'where' is treated as part of the embedded sentence-i.e., as part of [, B]-then the predicred logical form is (22b). Now, I'm not sure whether either of (ZZa-b) are well formed. But, even if they are, neither gives the right truth conditions for (19). Alice didn't ask whether John bought all that beer; she asked a where-question. yet a whether-question would seem to be the only possible reading of. (22a). As for (22b), it incorrectly says that Alice's utterance of ,Where did my brother buy all that beer?' samesays the indirect question ,where John bought all that beer'; but indirect questions and direct questions, though semantically related, are not samesayers: In the case at hand, the direct question denotes something propositional, while the indirect question denotes a location! Finally, of course,Alice didn't same-token'bought all that beer'; she same-tokened'buy all that beer'. One can react to this data about interrogative speech reports in two different ways. It certainly shows that Cappelen and Lepore's account is insufficiently general;so one could respond by trying to broaden the theory while still refusing to respect syntax. I gather this is how the authors themselves will respond. I, on the other hand, take it as a sign that an account of speech reports which respects syntax is likely to be preferable. I won't burden you with such an account, but will simply note that the seeds of an account can be found in Higginbotham's (1993) recent work.
Okay then: The lnterface Rule in (8) , to prefer, ceteris paribr4 a hypothesis about logical form which respects syntax, is reasonable (though defeasible); and, it appears to apply to the case at hand. Next point:The,that' of 'says that' is not a demonstrative in the surface syntax of speech reports.
This lends support to-though it does not entail-the conclusion that there is no demonstrative corresponding to 'that' in the logical form of speech reports. Hence Cappelen and Lepore's account is likely incorrect.s
D emons trating " R ogue U t t eran ces"
Here's a more direct argument: Whether or not there's a demonstrative in the surface structure of speech reports, positing a demonstrative in their logical form makes the wrong predictions about how speech reports get interpreted. Cappelen and Lepore cite with approval Davidson's (1979: .91) dictum that, "the device of pointing can be used on whatever is in range of the pointer. . ." I agree with the slogan. But I think it makes trouble for Davidson's paratactic account-and hence for Cappelen and Lepore. Notice: On Davidson's account, (23) is a perfect paraphrase of (5a):
(5a) Alice said that Dole is a goof (23) Alice said that. Dole is a goof. Now suppose I write on the board,'Dole is a great patriot'. And suppose I say (23) while pointing to what is written on the board. I take it that, given these circumstances, I could assert that Alice said that Dole is a great patriot-following up my assertion by adding that, in my own opinion, Dole is a goof. Now compare an utterance of (5a), said while pointing at'Dole is a great patriot'. Point how I may, in uttering (5a) I cannot report Alice as having said that Dole is a great patriot. There is, then, a striking contrast between (5a) and (23). What does the contrast amount to? The logical form of sentence (23) really does contain a demonstrative, and said demonstrative can be used to point to anything in the environment; the logical form of (5a), on the other hand, does not contain a demonstrative.e This difficulty carries over to Cappelen and Lepore's account.According to them, sentence (1a) has the logical form (1b).
(1a) Alice said that life "is difficult to understand" (1b) 3rz[says (Alice, a) & samesays(4 that) & same-tokens(4, these)]. Life is difficult to understand If that's right, one ought to be able to say (1a), point at a token of 'Dole is a great patriot', and thereby claim that some utterance of Alice's samesays 'Dole is a great patriot' and same-tokens.is a greatpatriot,! In these cir_ cumstances an utterance of (1a) would mean, in effeci:
(24) Alice said that Dole "is a great patriot." Life is difficult to understand obviously, no matter what-is pointed at, (1a) cannot be used to say this. In sum, because cappelen and Lepore foilow Davidson in posrting a demonstrative in rhe logical form of mixed quotations, they irit "rit t*o problems: First, their.theory does not respect syntax, which, given Interface Rule (B) is a bad thing; second, their theory makes incorrlct predictions about how mixed quotation sentences can be used. Two observations about what (25) says, before I lay out some of its virtues.Its first clause turns mixed quotations into indirect quotations; and its second clause is just the oxford-MlT Rule. In which case, (25) essentially treats mixed quotation as a variety of indirect quotation. Now for its merits.
_ one thing that (25) has going for it is this: According to cappelen and Lepo-re, mixed guotation blends the devices of direct "na ittciiict quotation. If that were right, there could be no mixed quotation device which was not also a direct quotation device. Now, is it really so obvious that there couldn't be a language which (a) had the translation of osay, taking clausal complementsi (b) never has'say' taking nominal complements-iand yet (c) exhibited mixed quotation? It would certainly seem possible. And this would precisely be a language which had indirect and mixed quotation, but no direct quotation. Tiavel to china might, I'm told, uncover such a language. But there are telling examples nearer to home. English has verbs which can only be used in indirect speech reports; and yeithey (marginally?) allow mixed quotation with such verbs-even though direct quotaRemarks on the Syntax and Semantics of Mixed Quotation 271 tion is not an option. Sentence (26a) is reasonably well formed, for example; while (26b) is completely out.
(26) (a) Mary intimated that life',is difficult to understand" (b) *Mary intimated, "life is difficult to understand"
English has lots of verbs like this:'communicate','assert','convey','suggest','state','deny', etc. In each case, mixed quotation using these verbg if a bit awkward, is reasonably good; while direct quotation is grammatically quite bad. Similarly, there are constructions for indirect quotation which do not accommodate direct quotation: e.g., fa Q-ed p to 01. Yet these constructions permit mixed quotation. A case in point: (27a-b) are both fine; but which "device for direct quotation" combines with (27a) here, to yteld (nQ? (27) (a) Jim pleaded with the firefighter to save his dog (b) Jim pleaded with the firefighter to save "his precious doggy"
In contrast with Cappelen and Lepore's account, a rule like (25) allows for mixed quotation even where direct quotation would be awkward. That's a virtue.
Next virtue of (25). Cappelen and Lepore argue that mixed quotation poses a problem for what I will call "traditional propositional theories" of indirect quotation: theories which require the reported speaker to stand in the saying relation to the proposition expressed by the complement clause. Here is the problem: Assume rc says ["" that O]lentails rsays([0](c)r. This assumption, an immediate consequence of traditional propositional theories, leads to one of two equally unhappy options, whenevet 0 contains mixed quotation-or so Cappelen and Lepore argue. If one supposes that [0] is nonsensical when 0 contains mixed quotation, rcr says ["* that e]t is falsely predicted to be nonsensical as well; if, on the other hand, one supposes that fO]has a coherent sense, it would seem that [O]would have to be about words-precisely because 0 is (mixed) quotational. But then rcr says [", that 0]1 is wrongly predicted to relate d to a meta-linguistic proposition.
An example may make Cappelen and Lepore's objection to traditional propositional theories clearer. Take (1a), and suppose that fi'Life "is difficult to understand"'lis nonsensical-because the sentence'Life "is dfficult to understand"' contains mixed quotation. On this assumption, there is no proposition to which Alice is related by (1"a), since there is no proposition expressed by'Life "is difficult to understand"'. Hence the entire sentence (1a) is falsely predicted to be nonsensical. Now the other horn of the RobertJ. Stainton dilemma. Suppose that f'Life "is difficult to understand"'] is a coherent proposition. what could it be about? It would seem that f.Life ,,is difficult to understand"'l would have to be a proposition about words-precisely because'Life "is difficult to understand"'is (mixed) quotational. so, on this assumption, what (1a) expresses is a relationship between Alice and a proposition about words. But this just isn't right: In so far as (1a) relates Alice to any proposition, it relates her to a proposition about life, to the effect that life is difficult to understand. And this isn't a proposition about words.
Cappelen and Lepore take these false predictions to spell doom for any semantics that has speech reports relate the reported speaker to the proposition expressed by the complement clause. But I think the problem lies elsewhere. one gets into trouble by supposing that the complement clause contains quotation marks at the point of interpretation: This makes it appear that either there is no proposition expressed by the complement clause, or the proposition expressed is meta-linguistic. But, applying the rule in (25), this "problem" vanishes: The quotation marks are ,,erased" before the proposition expressed by the complement clause is determined. This allows there to be a perfectly coherent proposition, not about words, to which the reported speaker can be related: It's the proposition expressed by 0, absent the mixed-quotational marks.
So much for the virtues of my alternative. Now some worries. You may have noticed that the rule in (25) implements an essentially deflationary approach to mixed quotation--one which Cappelen and Lepore explicitly reject:
. . . where quotes appear in the complement clause of an indirect report, remove the contribution of the quotes to the content expressed, and the resulting content must be identical to that of . . . the reported sentence (1997) .10
The problem with the deflationary strategy is supposed to be that "it ignores the contribution quotes make in mixed cases." In particular,'othe content expressed by the complement clause of a mixed case is about words"-and the deflationary strategy disregards this. (To clarify: Cappelen and Lepore argue that the complement clause isn't about words, as you just saw. But they maintain that the matrix sentence-the speech report, not the speech reported-is about words.) Ho*, then, do I propose to defend (25)?
Here's my "defense": The deflationary strategy, as implemented in (25), does not "ignore" or "disregard" the fact that mixed quotations are (in part) about words, because mixed quotations aren't about words. It's just not true that mixed quotations say something both about the content and about the form of the reported utterance: Nothing about words/form is said. And, contrary to what Cappelen and Lepore (1997: a$) claim, no words/forms are referred to by the speaker. Returning to the original example: In uttering (1a) the speaker asserts nothing whatever about the words employed; he doesn't talk about words at all. what the speaker asserls is precisely what (25) predicts: that Alice said something similar to [, Life is difficult to understand]; in which case, rule (25) does not "ignore; the fact that (1a) is (in part) about words/form-because (1a) isn't about words/form. It's only "about" content.
That being said, it's obvious that a use of (1a) would be very misleading, and hence very infelicitouso in a situation where Alice didn't actually speak the words'is difficult to understand'.This fact clouds intuitions about truth conditions: One is, for example, tempted to say that (1a) is false where Alice really uttered 'Life is tough to understand'. But this is a mistake, in my view. Here's a useful comparison, to highlight the nature of the error. Imagine Betty utters Alice said that life is difficult to understand', pronouncing'is difficult to understand'in a drunken tone. Betty would assert only (28) And yet, at the same time, Betty would "show" (as one used to say) that Alice slurred the words'is difficult to understand'-where the "showing" is so blatant that Betty's report would be fabulously out of line if Alice was not inebriated, and didn't sound it. Still, out of line or not. I don't think Betty would speak falsely-as long as Alice did, in fact, assert that life is difficult to understand. If I'm right, mixed quotes aren't about words. So, how do they work their special magic? In a word, mimicry. Seen from this perspective, mixed quotation marks are-to borrow an idea from Corey Washington 0992)-punctuation marks: Putting these marks in allows the writer to highlight the echoic nature of the utterance; but, despite Cappelen and Lepore's repeated insistence to the contrary a statement about words/form is no part of what the mixed-quote-user says. That is precisely why rule (25) does not err in erasing the quotes before computing the truth conditions of the mixed quotation speech report. Again: In mixed quotation, one "shows" the linguistic tools which were used by the reported speaker; and those 'owatching the show" acquire beliefs about the form of speech employed. But, to paraphrase Davidson's (1978: 261) thoughts on metaphor, it's an error to fasten on the contents of the thoughts a mixed quotation provokes, and to read these contents into the mixed quotation itself.
Other parallels are legion: A speaker could report parts of Alice's conversation in a squeaky voice, or with a French accent, or with a stutter, or using great volume. In none of these cases would the speech reporter say' assert, or state that Alice spoke in these various ways. Speaking thuq the audience will naturally take the speech reporter to be imitating Alice-why else speak in these peculiar ways? And, if the reporter wasn't accurately parrotingAlice, the audience may rightly censure him. But this by no means establishes that anything false was said about Alice's voice, accent, tone, etc.: In these cases, the truth conditions of the speech report are exhausted by the meaning of the words, and how the words are put together; as far as truth conditions are concerned, the tone, volume, accent etc. add nothing whatever. Ditto, say I, for the quotation marks in mixed quotation.In which case (1a) isn't false where Alice actually speaks the words,'is tough to understand'. It may, of course, be infelicitous and misleading. In spades. But this doesn,t distinguish it from the infelicitous and misleading use of a drunken tone, when reporting the speech of a teetotaler. Given this, no special semantic rule is required to capture o'the extra" truth conditions, the statement "about words," encoded in mixed quotations. There is none.ll
The foregoing closely connects with another possible worry about (25)' Cappelen and Lepore argue that a theory of quotation must satisfy four constraints:
(29) Cappelen and Lepore's Constraints Cl: Mixed and indirect quotation should receive overlapping semantic treatments. C2: Direct and mixed quotation should receive overlapping semantic reatments. c3: Direct and indirect quotation should receive distinct semantic treatments. C4: Quotation in pure, direct, and mixed quotation should receive overlapping semantic treatments. Now, rule (25) easily satisfies c1: If I'm right, mixed quotation is a variety of indirect quotation. And C3 poses no special problem either, since nothing in (25) conflicts with the idea that indirect quotation conveys the con' teit of. the reported speech, whereas direct quotation notes the form. It might seem that my account cannot satisfy C2; but, in fact, mixed quotation miy show what direct quotation must Jay-so there is an overlap.The real problem is C4. What pure and direct quotation have in common is that both are "about" form. And, if I'm right, this isn't true of mixed quotation: As far as truth conditions are concerned, mixed quotation is indirect quotation-hence mixed quotation says nothing about form. Therefore, in contrast with dilect quotation, mixed quotation (as I see it, anyway) is not at all like pure quotation. Which violates C4.
Here I bite the bullet: My account, encapsulated in (25), fails with respect to C4. Happily, C4 may not be a valid constraint on theories of quotation. The principle argument which Cappelen and Lepore adduce in favour of C4 goes as follows: The arguments in (30) are valid; if C4 were false, these arguments would not be valid; therefore, C4 is true.
(30) (a) Alice said, "Life is difficult to understand." Therefore, a token of 'Life is difficult to understand' was uttered. [This inference indicates that direct and pure quotation are linked.l (b) Alice said that life "is difficult to understand." Therefore, a token of is difficult to understand'was uttered. [This inference indicates that mixed and pure quotation are linked.l
The problem with Cappelen and Lepore's argument tor C4 is its first premise: (30b) is not a valid inference. As I said above, where a token of 'is difficult to understand' was rxol uttered, a use of Alice said that life "is difficult to understand"' would be extremely misleadingly and thoroughly unhappy. But it wouldn't be strictly speaking false-assuming Alice said something sufficiently similar to'life is difficult to understand'. Just like the use of a drunken tone in indirect quotation doesn't automatically renders the report false, if the reported speaker was cold sober. Hence the premise of (30b) may be true while its conclusion is false. Given the invalidity of (30b), one cannot safely argue from its validity to the truth of C4! And,Iacking a solid argument for C4, the latter cannot be used to discredit rule (25).12 Let me sum up. I noted two problems with Cappelen and Lepore's suggested account of mixed quotation. Both derive immediately from positing a demonstrative, corresponding to the 'that' of 'says that', in the logical form of these speech reports: First, inserting a demonstrative in logical form conflicts with the Interface Rule (8)-given the fact that there is not, in general, a demonstrative in the surface structure; second, positing a demonstrative in logical form leads to the (incorrect) prediction that "the demonstrative" can be used to pick out rogue utterances in the context, Having noted these problems with Cappelen and Lepore's theory I suggested a positive alternative: that mixed quotation is equivalent to indirect quotation*give or take some mimicry. If that's right, Cappelen and Lepore are likely mistaken when they claim that "the influential views on the semantics of indirect quotation cannot accommodate mixed quotation . . ." (p. 4). All these "influential views" require, to cover mixed quotation, is a story about verbal imitation consistent with their treatment of indirect speech.
